The Fed's decentralized structure protects monetary policy from presidential control

Monetary policy decisions would be made by regional Fed bank presidents who the president cannot control if the legal protections barring the Federal Reserve Board of Governors from removal by the president were overturned. This outcome is the central argument of former Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision Randal Quarles, who says the Board of Governors should serve at the pleasure of the president.

The Supreme Court is considering rulings on the president's ability to dismiss members of independent regulatory agencies and whether the president erred in attempting to fire Fed Gov. Lisa Cook. If the court overturns the precedent protecting these agencies from at-will removal, the Board of Governors would become executive offices serving at the pleasure of the president.

Monetary policy is made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which consists of the Board of Governors and rotating regional Fed bank presidents. Because regional Fed bank presidents are not government officials and are not directly chosen by the president, they provide a resilience to short-term political direction.

Quarles argues that the president could fire the entire board to gain a voting majority on the FOMC, but Senate confirmation requirements for new nominees would impede such a move. Until at least six board members are confirmed by the Senate, monetary policy decisions would be made by the regional Fed bank presidents.